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The Libyan civil war
began as a series of protests in the eastern city of Benghazi in early February
2011. Muammar Qaddaª’s government lost control over most of the eastern
province of Cyrenaica later that month. The opposition in the east formed the
National Transitional Council (NTC) and announced leadership positions on
March 5.1
On April 4, 2011, Italy announced its full recognition of the NTC as Libya’s
ofªcial government.2 This statement came only four days after the start of
NATO’s Operation Uniªed Protector, which had not yet dislodged Qaddaª’s
forces. Other states supporting the anti-Qaddaª rebels, including France and
the United States, extended recognition to the NTC over the next three
months.3 These bilateral recognitions carried material beneªts for the NTC.
Recognizing countries transferred frozen Libyan assets totaling billions of dol-
lars to the new rebel government, all while the ªghting on the ground contin-
ued.4 France and the United Kingdom also directly provided military aid to
Marika Landau-Wells is a postdoctoral research fellow in the Department of Brain and Cognitive Studies at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an incoming assistant professor of political science at the
University of California, Berkeley.
For helpful comments during the development of this project, the author thanks Fotini Christia,
Jeffry Frieden, Cullen Nutt, Roger Petersen, Barry Posen, Lucas Stanczyk, Lily Tsai, and panel par-
ticipants at the 2017 annual meeting of the International Studies Association. The author also
thanks the anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions.
1. Anthony Bell and David Witter, “The Libyan Revolution: Roots of Rebellion” (Washington,
D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, 2011), p. 8, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/libyan-
revolution-part-i-roots-rebellion.
2. Stefan A.G. Talmon, “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council,” ASIL Insight
Vol. 1, No. 6 (2011), p. 3.
3. For France and the United Arab Emirates, see ibid., pp. 3–4. For the United States, see U.S. De-
partment of State, “Special Brieªng, 15 July 2011” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State,
2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168662.htm. For the United Kingdom,
see Colin Warbrick, “British Policy and the National Transitional Council of Libya,” International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 252–253, doi:10.1017/
S0020589311000649. For the Libya Contact Group generally, see United Nations (UN) Security
Council, “Libya: August 2011 Monthly Forecast” (New York: UN, 2011), http://www.security
councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2011-08/.
4. For assets held in Italy, see Osvaldo Croci and Marco Valigi, “Continuity and Change in Italian
Foreign Policy: The Case of the International Intervention in Libya,” Contemporary Italian Politics,
Vol. 5, No. 1 (April 2013), pp. 38–54, doi:10.1080/23248823.2013.781373. For assets held in the
United Kingdom, see Chriso Summers, “How Did Libyan Money Come to Be Printed in Britain?”
BBC News, September 2, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14746873. For the U.S. case, see
International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Summer 2018), pp. 100–137, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00321
© 2018 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
High Stakes and Low Bars
High Stakes and
Low Bars
Marika Landau-Wells
How International Recognition Shapes
the Conduct of Civil Wars
100
anti-Qaddaª forces, beyond the support they offered under Uniªed Protector.5
In exchange for recognition, the NTC’s allies gained a geopolitical objective,
the ouster of Qaddaª. Evidence also suggests that both the Italian and French
governments used recognition of the NTC as part of a strategy to secure bene-
ªcial treatment of their oil companies after the war.6
Most states in the international system did not extend recognition to the
NTC until late August 2011, however, when anti-Qaddaª forces began their as-
sault on Tripoli.7 Between August 20 and a declaration of control over Tripoli
on August 31, thirty countries recognized the NTC as Libya’s new govern-
ment.8 Despite their objections to NATO’s role in Libyan regime change,
Russia recognized the NTC on September 1 and China on September 12.9 On
September 16, approximately two weeks after the fall of Tripoli, the NTC was
given Libya’s UN seat.10 By mid-September 2011, the NTC was thus treated as
the sovereign authority of Libya within the most meaningful forum of interna-
tional relations and by all major powers.11
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Sebnem Arsu and Steven Erlanger, “Libya Rebels Get Formal Backing, and $30 Billion,” New York
Times, July 15, 2011.
5. Louis Charbonneau and Hamuda Hassan, “France Defends Arms Airlift to Libyan Rebels,”
Reuters, June 29, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya/france-defends-arms-airlift-to-
libyan-rebels-idUSTRE7270JP20110629.
6. Sam Foster Halabi, “Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: The Libyan Intervention in Historical
and Theoretical Context,” American University International Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2012),
pp. 381–382; and Julian Borger and Terry Macalister, “The Race Is on for Libya’s Oil, with Britain
and France Both Staking a Claim,” Guardian, September 1, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2011/sep/01/libya-oil.
7. Anthony Bell, Spencer Butts, and David Witter, “The Libyan Revolution: The Tide Turns”
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, 2011), pp. 17–20, http://www.understandingwar
.org/report/libyan-revolution-part-4-tide-turns.
8. A list of individual recognition statements of the NTC is available in the online supplementary
material, doi:10.7910/DVN/72GCGD. I have followed Talmon, “Recognition of the Libyan Na-
tional Transitional Council,” in coding as recognition of the NTC only those statements in which
the NTC is recognized as the government or sovereign authority, not as simply the representative
of the Libyan people.
9. Steve Gutterman, “Russia Recognizes Libya’s Transitional Council,” Reuters, September 1, 2011,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-russia/russia-recognises-libyas-transitional-council-
idUSTRE7800WS20110901; and Tania Branigan, “Libya’s NTC Gains Chinese Recognition” Guard-
ian, September 12, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/12/libya-ntc-chinese-
recognition.
10. Twelve states protested this action in the UN General Assembly. See UN, “After Much Wran-
gling, General Assembly Seats National Transitional Council of Libya as Country’s Representative
for Sixty-Sixth Session (GA/11137)” (New York: UN, September 16, 2011), http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2011/ga11137.doc.htm.
11. The legal signiªcance of recognition has been a subject of study in Western international law
since Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). Canonical examples include Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in
International Law, Vol. 3 (1947; repr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Chen Ti-
Chiang, The International Law of Recognition, with Special Reference to Practice in Great Britain and the
United States, L.C. Green, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1951); Hans Kelsen, “Recognition in Interna-
At no point in the years since achieving international recognition has the
NTC, or its successor, the General National Congress, possessed undisputed
physical control over all Libyan territory.12 Although Qaddaª was killed on
October 20, 2011, ªghting has continued between the NTC and various armed
groups at levels consistent with its designation as a civil war.13
The unfolding of events in Libya illustrates the signiªcance of international
recognition during civil conºict. States allied with anti-Qaddaª forces were
able to use bilateral recognition of the NTC to affect the balance of capabilities
in the conºict, both because they could transfer Libyan state assets to the re-
bels and because they could provide enhanced military assistance. Multilateral
recognition by UN member states also generated both international legitimacy
and material resources for the NTC while it struggled to establish control of
the country after Qaddaª’s demise.14
The Libyan case also highlights an underappreciated aspect of civil wars:
political victory and military victory are not the same. Moreover, it is political
victory that is the objective of combatants. Recognition establishes political
victory in the international arena—it is a declaration of which individuals will
be treated as the state’s political authorities—and its timing is discretionary.15
Recognition is, thus, a powerful tool of foreign policy.
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tional Law: Theoretical Observations,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October
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tion,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July 1950), pp. 548–559, doi:10.2307/
2194030. For Cold War and post–Cold War scholarship, see L. Thomas Galloway, Recognizing For-
eign Governments: The Practice of the United States (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1978); M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1815–1995 (New
York: St. Martin’s, 1997); and Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
12. Christopher S. Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini, Libya after Qaddaª: Lessons and Implications for the
Future (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2014), pp. 20–24.
13. Bell and Witter, “The Libyan Revolution: Roots of Rebellion,” pp. 20–21. From 2011 through
2014, the average number of battle deaths per year was far more than the 100 battle deaths per
year that qualify a war as ongoing under the coding rules used in this analysis. See “UCDP Battle-
Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015” (Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conºict Research,
Uppsala University, 2015).
14. For example, the UN Support Mission in Libya was established on September 16, 2011, al-
though its footprint was limited. See Chivvis and Martini, Libya after Qaddaª, p. 6. In December
2011, the NTC also received a peacebuilding grant of $3 million from the World Bank, which lends
only to the sovereign governments of member countries. All UN members are members of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group, with the exception of Andorra, Cuba,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, and North Korea. See World Bank Treasury, “Everything You Always
Wanted to Know about the World Bank” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, n.d.), http://
treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/WorldBankFacts.pdf; and Simon Gray to Hassan Ziglam,
December 20, 2011, World Bank Documents and Reports online archive, http://documents
.worldbank.org/curated/en/614991468046737022/Ofªcial-Documents-Agreement-for-Grant-
TF011413.
15. George Modelski, “The International Relations of Internal War,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., In-
In the sixty-one center-seeking civil wars (i.e., sovereignty disputes over the
entire state) initiated from 1945 to 2014, rebel groups achieved political victory
(by securing bilateral recognition) prior to military victory in sixteen of the
eighteen extra-constitutional transfers of sovereign authority.16 Nor were these
new rebel governments on the brink of military victory when they achieved
recognition. The median conºict continued 6.8 years following recognition by
another state.17 Multilateral recognition at the United Nations—receiving a
state’s seat—follows a similar pattern. In thirteen out of the eighteen cases (in-
cluding Libya), rebel challengers received UN seats before achieving military
victory. This practice runs counter to claims by international legal scholars that
recognition should be transferred only to rebel groups that establish “effective
control,” deªned as “undisputed paramountcy of physical power,” within
their state.18
The motivating question of this article is: What explains the decision to ac-
cord one party or another status as the ofªcial government of a state in the
midst of a civil war?
I evaluate two theories of recognition, both visible in the Libyan case: recog-
nition driven by the prospects for economic and geopolitical gain; and recogni-
tion driven by a simple test, control of the capital city.
I process trace each of the sixty-one civil wars initiated from 1945 to 2014 to
identify the moments when recognition occurs, as well as deliberate non-
recognition. I ªnd that states generally have followed a decision rule confer-
ring recognition on whoever holds the capital city.19 The spike in recognitions
that the NTC received as rebel forces assaulted Tripoli is indicative of this
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ternational Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 31. Multilat-
eral recognition usually occurs when a meeting of member-state representatives convenes, and so
the timing is less discretionary than the timing of bilateral recognition. Some bodies, such as the
UN, convene regularly on established timetables (see below for the discussion of UN credential-
ing). Other bodies convene irregularly.
16. If the analysis is restricted to those cases where recognition occurred at least one year before
war’s end, then 14 of 18 cases would be considered premature. Of the 2 cases in which recognition
occurred within one year of the war’s end, 1 (Ethiopia) has a 365-day spread between ªrst bilateral
recognition and the end of the war. The other (China) has a 211-day spread, and the analysis as-
sumes that Taiwan is not within the state’s borders.
17. The mean is 9.7 years. The distribution of conºict duration after premature recognition has a
long tail, so I report the median unless noted otherwise.
18. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Vol. 3, p. 125; and Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy
in International Law, p. 136.
19. I follow Stephen D. Krasner’s deªnition of “rule” here. See Krasner, “Structural Causes and
Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2
(Spring 1982), p. 186, doi:10.1017/S0020818300018920. See also Michael Barnett and Martha
Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 2004).
broader pattern. States do, on occasion, prioritize their own geopolitical and
economic gains over any standards of territorial control when deciding whom
to recognize, as NTC allies did, but this behavior is rare, and most cases in-
volve the United States withholding recognition from communist govern-
ments during the Cold War.
The general decision rule to accord recognition based on capital city control
has profound consequences during civil war. In particular, it generates rational
incentives for combatants to use any means necessary to gain or maintain hold
of the capital’s underlying territory. There is, however, no incentive to keep the
city intact. I ªnd that in twelve of the nineteen cases in which rebels succeeded
in contesting the capital, more than 50 percent of the city’s infrastructure
was destroyed or the majority of the population was displaced, or both.
Mogadishu, Brazzaville, and Kabul are all examples of capital cities reduced to
rubble in the service of achieving international recognition.20 Evidence sug-
gests that combatants are aware of this incentive structure surrounding recog-
nition. For example, William Reno documents how Charles Taylor ªxated on
capturing Monrovia as the key to becoming “the internationally recognized
president,” despite establishing a signiªcant personal ªefdom within the bulk
of Liberian territory.21 Repeated assaults on Monrovia over the course of the
war damaged all of its major infrastructure.22
This targeting of the capital city also has long-term consequences for state
strength. First, the destruction of the city and the displacement of the popula-
tion weakens the state itself, given that the basic infrastructure of these cities is
a prerequisite for the delivery of public goods, both locally and statewide.23
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20. For Mogadishu, see Isabelle Duyvesten, Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Libe-
ria and Somalia (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 113; John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?
2nd ed. (London: HAAN, 2001), p. x; and Anna Simons, Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 91. For Brazzaville, see UN Security Council, “Report of the
Secretary-General on the Situation in the Republic of Congo (S/1997/814)” (New York: UN, Octo-
ber 21, 1997), pp. 7–8. For Kabul, see Human Rights Watch, Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in
Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy of Impunity (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005), pp. 22–100,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/afghanistan0605/afghanistan0605.pdf; and Richard S. New-
ell, “Chapter 4: Government and Politics,” in Peter Blood, ed., Afghanistan: A Country Study (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Library of Congress, n.d.), http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/afghanistan/
afghanistan.html.
21. William Reno, “How Sovereignty Matters: International Markets and the Political Economy of
Local Markets in Weak States,” in Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham, eds., In-
tervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), p. 202.
22. Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conºict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, 2003), p. 15.
23. State strength has many deªnitions. I rely on Robert I. Rotberg’s premise that state strength
Second, setting the bar for political victory low—at territorial control of
the capital—may also lower the perceived costs of initiating conºict to gain
political authority in the ªrst place, thus weakening the strength of elec-
toral institutions.
Given the perverse incentives created by the capital control test, this article
also considers brieºy the historical precedents for altering the standards of in-
ternational recognition. Based on these precedents, I suggest that states collec-
tively can alter combatant incentives if they are willing to make two changes to
current recognition practice: removing territorial control as a sufªcient condi-
tion for recognition and formalizing the use of nonrecognition at the UN.
These two changes allow new recognition criteria, such as a necessary minimal
standard of battleªeld conduct, to have teeth.
This article contributes to the limited literature on recognition of govern-
ments, arguing that it should be studied as a meaningful tool of foreign policy.
It also identiªes a pattern in recognition behavior during civil wars with con-
sequences for the conduct of conºict. Finally, it provides a starting point from
which to debate the standards of international recognition, by arguing that the
current procedure is driven by convenience, not necessity, and that alternatives
are plausible.
The article proceeds in seven sections. First, I review the foundational schol-
arship on the recognition of governments within international law, to provide
deªnitions of the core concepts. Second, I examine the existing literature re-
garding the signiªcance of recognition in the study of civil war. In the third
section, I introduce the two models of recognition behavior. The fourth section
discusses the data, including case identiªcation and variable coding. In the
ªfth section, I review civil wars in three countries—Angola, Cambodia, and
Chad—where primary and secondary sources provide insight into the drivers
of bilateral and multilateral recognition. The sixth section tests whether the
conclusions drawn from these case studies travel to the remainder of the data.
The ªnal section concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
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should be understood as a function of the ability to effectively deliver vital public goods. See
Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in Rotberg, ed.,
State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2003), p. 3. Similarly, the U.K. Department for International Development deªnes state fragility
based on an inability to deliver core functions to a majority of the population. See Department for
International Development, “Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States” (London:
Department for International Development, 2005), p. 7.
Recognition in International Law
M.J. Peterson describes recognition as “a discretionary act producing binding
effects,” where these “binding effects” are manifested as consequences in
law.24 There are two kinds of recognition within international politics: recogni-
tion of states and recognition of governments. Although recognition of one is
not entirely independent of the other, they are conceptually distinct.25 I ex-
clude secessionist civil wars (and, thus, the creation of new states) from this
analysis because they contain both types of recognition, which are hard to dis-
entangle within a single case. I do discuss the state recognition literature in the
next section, however, as it bears on the recognition of governments.
According to the Foreign Affairs Law of the United States, recognizing a
government is a “formal acknowledgment that a particular regime is the effec-
tive government of a state and implies a commitment to treat that regime as
the government of that state.”26 In this formulation, “effective” does not mean
“functionally true.” Rather, it means an entity with legal standing.27
The Foreign Affairs Law stipulates that “treating a regime as a government
includes accepting its acts as creating international rights and obligations.”28
In practice, governments have a certain bundle of privileges that accrue
through this recognized sovereign authority. These include possession of the
legitimate means of violence, entitlement to the disbursement of state assets,
legal standing in international courts, the ability to create binding contracts on
behalf of the state, and the right to designate the state’s representatives in in-
ternational institutions.29 In short, recognition of a government by another
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24. Peterson, Recognition of Governments, p. 29.
25. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, p. 135.
26. Restatement of the Law, Third: Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol. 1 (St. Paul: American
Law Institute, 1987), section 203.a.
27. Peterson, Recognition of Governments, p. 2. For a discussion of the distinction (or lack thereof)
between the phrases “de facto recognition” and “de jure recognition,” see Lauterpacht, Recognition
in International Law, Vol. 3, p. 284–288. Peterson clariªes that de jure recognition is the default posi-
tion unless otherwise speciªed. See Peterson, Recognition of Governments, p. 86. U.S. recognition of
the ªrst government of Israel is an example of this kind of speciªcation. President Harry Truman
recognized “the provisional Government as the de facto authority of the new state of Israel” on
May 14, 1948. See Statement of the President re: Recognition of Israel, May 14, 1948, Handwriting
of the President, Alphabetical Correspondence File, 1916–1950, Charles G. Ross Papers, Harry S.
Truman Library and Archives, Independence, Missouri. The recognition was intended as a place-
holder until a permanent government was elected. After elections in January 1949, Truman ex-
tended de jure recognition to the resulting entity. See Press Release, January 31, 1949, OF 204-D:
Jewish State, 1948–1948, box 914, Ofªcial File, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library and Ar-
chives. This type of nuanced recognition is rare after 1945.
28. Restatement of the Law, Third, section 203.b.
29. Wright, “Some Thoughts about Recognition,” p. 555.
state refers to the acknowledgment that a particular set of individuals has the
unique legal authority to commit a number of signiªcant acts on behalf of
the state. Throughout this article, I use the terms “recognition” or “full recog-
nition” to refer to this formal, legalistic act.
When a state undergoes a constitutional change of government, recognition
is not generally a subject of discussion. When the change occurs outside the
bounds of a state’s constitutional process—through conquest, popular revolu-
tion, or coup, for example—recognition comes into question.30 In this context,
when states recognize a new government before it has achieved effective con-
trol over the country’s territory, it is described as “premature” and a violation
of international law.31 The “premature” label also applies to recognition of a
new rebel government while the incumbent is still putting up a ªght in state
territory.32 Recognition—particularly if it is premature—is fundamentally a
constitutive act for weak governments.33 When other states deem a particular
government to be the bearer of the sovereign rights and privileges, that gov-
ernment then holds those rights independent of its capacity to act on them.34
Recognition can occur on several levels of interstate relations. Bilateral rec-
ognition creates a legal entity for the purpose of the recognizer’s domestic
courts. This entity can initiate lawsuits, possesses immunity from lawsuits in
some contexts, is generally entitled to state property within the recognizer’s
jurisdiction, and is able to enter into bilateral agreements.35
Multilateral forums represent a separate context in which states can accord
High Stakes and Low Bars 107
30. M.J. Peterson, “Political Use of Recognition: The Inºuence of the International System,” World
Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (April 1982), p. 325, doi:10.2307/2010322.
31. Ibid., p. 329. Recognition of the NTC in Libya qualiªed as premature. See Talmon, “Recogni-
tion of the Libyan National Transitional Council,” p. 5; and John B. Bellinger III, “Legal Questions
in U.S. Nod to Libya’s Opposition” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, July 18, 2011).
32. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Vol. 3, pp. 93–94.
33. Charles Zorgbibe, La Guerre Civile [Civil war] (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975),
p. 142.
34. For a speciªc application of this argument, see Pierre Englebert, “Why Congo Persists: Sover-
eignty, Globalization, and the Violent Reproduction of a Weak State” (Oxford: Queen Elizabeth
House, Oxford University, February 2003). For the alternative argument that recognition is primar-
ily a declaratory act (i.e., an observation of fact), see Thomas D. Grant, The Recognition of States: Law
and Practice in Debate and Evolution (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999).
35. Peterson, Recognition of Governments, pp. 144–152. Some states try to avoid the recognition is-
sue by arguing that their conduct is sufªcient to signal recognition of the entity in question, with-
out a formal announcement. Stefan Talmon documents this for the United Kingdom since 1980.
See Talmon, “Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice,”
British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 231–297, doi:10.1093/bybil/
63.1.231. Peterson describes this as “tacit recognition” and notes that certain behaviors (establish-
ment of formal diplomatic relations or formal consular relations, or conclusion of a bilateral treaty)
have long been considered equivalent to formal explicit recognition. See Peterson, Recognition of
Governments, pp. 86–88. I consider them equivalent here.
recognition to one another.36 For example, representatives of United Nations
member states—by virtue of accepting another representative’s credentials—
collectively determine who has the right to speak on behalf of that member
state.37 UN-level recognition is treated as a signal of membership in the inter-
national community of governments as a whole.38 The most signiªcant legal
consequence of multilateral recognition at the UN level is the access to funds
and assistance provided through UN organizations and afªliates such as the
World Bank, which deal only with sovereigns.
Legal scholars note that there is no inherent requirement for states to
extend recognition to another government bilaterally or in a multilateral fo-
rum, even the most territorially established one.39 Thus, in either setting recog-
nition is discretionary.
During civil war, recognition has a number of consequential legal effects.
The language states use to avoid granting full recognition to rebels indicates
this is well understood.40 First, it legitimizes certain military entities and
delegitimizes others, including third-party interveners.41 Second, recognition
determines which combatants are entitled to draw on state assets to aid their
cause.42 In practice, assets controlled by foreign governments and corporations
can be substantial and their disposition entirely determined by recognition.
For these reasons, bilateral premature recognition itself is classiªed, in interna-
tional legal terms, as an act of intervention in civil war.43 Multilateral recog-
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36. Hans Aufricht, “Principles and Practices of Recognition by International Organizations,”
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October 1949), pp. 699–704, doi:10.2307/
2193259.
37. Farrokh Jhabvala, “The Credentials Approach to Representation Questions in the UN General
Assembly,” California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7 (Summer 1977), pp. 615–636; and
Suellen Ratliff, “UN Representation Disputes: A Case Study of Cambodia and a New Accredita-
tion Proposal for the Twenty-ªrst Century,” California Law Review, Vol. 87, No. 5 (October 1999),
pp. 1207–1264, doi:10.15779/Z38C71W. There was some debate on this point at the UN, particu-
larly in 1950 as related to the representation of China, but legal scholars support this interpre-
tation. See Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of the Fundamental
Problems—with Supplement (New York: Praeger, 1950), pp. 946–947.
38. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, p. 947 n. 4.
39. Peterson, Recognition of Governments, pp. 103–120.
40. Talmon, “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council,” pp. 2–3; and Stefan
Talmon, “Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People,” Chinese
Journal of International Law, Vol. 12 (2013), pp. 226–230, doi:10.1093/chinesejil/jmt014.
41. Christopher J. Le Mon, “Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in Civil Wars: The Effective Con-
trol Test Tested,” NYU Journal of International Law & Politics, Vol. 35 (2002), p. 743.
42. For Angola and oil revenues, see George Wright, The Destruction of a Nation: United States’
Policy toward Angola since 1945 (Chicago: Pluto, 1997), p. 72. For a discussion of ship registration
revenues in the Liberia case, see Michael E. Field, “Liberia v. Bickford: The Continuing Problem of
Recognition of Governments and Civil Litigation in the United States,” Maryland Journal of Interna-
tional Law & Trade, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1994), pp. 113–148.
43. Bellinger, “Legal Questions in U.S. Nod to Libya’s Opposition”; and Talmon, “Recognition of
Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People,” p. 244.
nition also permits embattled regimes to request intervention forces and
ªnancial support.44 Both bilateral and multilateral recognition, therefore, have
legal consequences that can affect the course of civil war.
Recognition in Civil War Scholarship
Existing scholarship on recognition has focused, more often than not, on the
issue of recognizing new states.45 Although new state recognition is con-
ceptually distinct, the standards are suggestive for the recognition of new
governments. Speciªcally, there is a similar tension between according recog-
nition based on shared decision rules and according recognition based on po-
litical expediency.
The most comparable situations to the recognition of governments during
civil war are those arising from wars of secession.46 In the period from 1815 to
1945, James Crawford argues that facts on the ground, in terms of independ-
ence and effective territorial control, played a decisive role in third-party rec-
ognition.47 Effectiveness as a criterion for new state recognition did not appear
especially relevant after 1945, however, particularly with the new states arising
from decolonization.48 Crawford argues that in the modern era, when the en-
tity is not a “self-determination unit” or colony, recognition of a new state
out of political expediency does not occur unless the home state grants permis-
sion.49 This suggests that the motivations of third-party recognizers may be
checked by certain tacit rules.
Bridget Coggins, however, argues that the political motivations of third-
party recognizers can be decisive when the creation of new states is viewed as
a social process.50 Coggins also highlights that this politicized recognition of
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44. For an example in Chad, see William J. Foltz, “Chad’s Third Republic: Strengths, Problems,
and Prospects,” CSIS Africa Notes, October 30, 1987, p. 2. For an example in Liberia, see UN Secu-
rity Council, Resolution 1509 (New York: UN, September 19, 2003).
45. See James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2006); Bridget Coggins, “Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emer-
gence of States from Secessionism,” International Organization, Vol. 65, No. 3 (July 2011), pp. 433–
467, doi:10.1017/S0020818311000105; Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the
Establishment of New States since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Bridget
Coggins, Power Politics and State Formation in the Twentieth Century: The Dynamics of Recognition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
46. James Crawford deªnes secession as “the creation of a State by the use or threat of force with-
out the consent of the former sovereign.” See Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law,
p. 375.
47. Ibid., p. 376.
48. Fabry, Recognizing States, pp. 147–149.
49. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, p. 390.
50. Coggins, “Friends in High Places,” pp. 435–436.
new states can have consequences at the level of the international system, be-
cause more states begin life internally weak than would be the case if effective-
ness were a meaningful criterion.51
Scholarship on the recognition of governments has primarily focused on the
reasons why rebel groups pursue recognition.52 One motive is economic. As
Jennifer Hazen argues, access to resources is a critical, dynamic element of
rebel group capacity during civil war.53 Incumbents have privileged access to
funds, resulting in part from their sovereign status. For example, multinational
ªrms engaged in monetizing natural resources prefer to deal with sovereigns
as a risk-mitigation strategy.54 Long-term extraction of resources requires con-
tracts that can be enforced, and enforcement requires that both parties to the
contract have legal standing. Although preemptive deals for domestic natural
resource exploitation are occasionally struck with rebel groups, these agree-
ments are relatively rare.55 Other economic advantages of sovereignty during
civil war include access to international capital markets, speciªcally for large-
scale borrowing.56
A second reason rebel groups pursue recognition concerns the military bal-
ance. Odd Arne Westad has noted that recognition can enable a shift from
receiving covert to overt military aid, and that the scale of overt aid can be
substantially greater.57 Reyko Huang has shown more generally that some
rebel groups devote considerable resources toward securing beneªts from
third parties, including but not limited to recognition, as a tactic within their
overall campaign.58
This existing literature thus sheds light on the motives for combatants seek-
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Talk,” in Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasªr, and Zachariah Mempilly, eds., Rebel Governance in Civil War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 98–118; and Reyko Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy
in Civil War,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89–126, doi:10.1162/
ISEC_a_00237.
53. Jennifer M. Hazen, What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2013).
54. Reno, “How Sovereignty Matters,” pp. 207–208.
55. For more on the “booty futures” concept, see Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources
Inºuence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Win-
ter 2004), pp. 58–59, doi:10.1017/S002081830458102X. For the Chadian case, see Macartan
Humphreys, “Natural Resources, Conºict, and Conºict Resolution: Uncovering the Mecha-
nisms,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4 (August 2005), pp. 508–509, doi:10.1177/
0022002705277545; and Millard J. Burr and Robert O. Collins, Africa’s Thirty Years’ War: Libya, Chad,
and the Sudan, 1963–1993 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999).
56. Reno, “How Sovereignty Matters,” p. 199; Felix Gerdes, Civil War and State Formation: The Polit-
ical Economy of War and Peace in Liberia (Frankfurt-am-Main: Campus Verlag, 2013), p. 111.
57. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 236.
58. Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” pp. 97–100.
ing recognition during civil war. The motives of third-party recognizers, how-
ever, remain an open question.
Models of International Recognition
In this section, I outline two models of government recognition during civil
war that echo the debate surrounding the recognition of new states: a model of
self-interest and a model of capital city control. Each model makes different
predictions about the conditions under which states will extend recognition to
rebel governments during civil wars.
a model of self-interest
As stated at the outset, recognition is a powerful tool of foreign policy. With
this tool, states wield the power to ratify and even construct their peer govern-
ments.59 It is plausible, then, that states use recognition to advance their
interests within the international system and to shape the membership of
the system itself.
As with the recognition of new states, self-interest may derive from the
geopolitical advantages gained by recognizing friendly governments or with-
holding recognition from unfriendly ones. Alternatively, as Reno suggests,
self-interest also can take the form of economic gains, generally through pref-
erential access to resource exploitation.60 The Libya case provides an example
of both geopolitical and economic beneªts. France and Italy stood to gain eco-
nomically by early recognition of the NTC through their national oil compa-
nies. Other NTC allies, the United States included, perceived a geopolitical
beneªt from replacing Qaddaª with a friendlier alternative.61
A self-interested actor may still be concerned about getting recognition
wrong, however. On the one hand, nonrecognition of an eventual victor can
alienate the new government.62 On the other hand, extending recognition to an
entity that is ultimately defeated on the battleªeld can be embarrassing.63
Therefore, the decision to recognize requires weighing risks against rewards.
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61. Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicholas Sarkozy, “Opinion: Libya’s Pathway to Peace,”
New York Times, April 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15
.html.
62. For example, the NTC was displeased about Russia’s relatively slow recognition of it. See
Federica Saini Fasanotti, “Russia and Libya: A Brief History of an On-Again-Off-Again Friend-
ship,” Order from Chaos blog, September 1, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2016/09/01/russia-and-libya-a-brief-history-of-an-on-again-off-again-friendship.
63. For examples, see Amikam Nachmani, International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The
United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, 1947–1952 (New York: Greenwood, 1990), p. 113;
If this model accurately captures the motivations behind state recognition
practice, one is most likely to see premature recognition—recognition at its
most discretionary—when gains are available and the risk of backing the
wrong actor is minimal.
the capital city control test
The self-interest model does not ascribe signiªcance to a decision-rule ap-
proach to recognition, particularly in the presence of net beneªts to the
recognizer. As Coggins points out with respect to the creation of new states,
however, there are reasons to suspect that the arbitrariness afforded by a
model of self-interest would pose a signiªcant problem for the current
state system.64
I propose that, since 1945, states have relied on a model of recognition with a
minimal decision rule: control of the capital city as a necessary and sufªcient
condition for international recognition.65
There are several reasons why I argue that recognition may be a rule-driven
sphere of international relations in general and why I hypothesize that the cap-
ital control test speciªcally guides recognition practice. First, rule-based recog-
nition appears to have been the norm prior to World War II, though what
constituted the “rules” evolved over time.66 Second, there appears to be a
peacetime rule in place for sovereign authorities in postcolonial states, where
control of the capital is sufªcient for continued recognition of a government.67
This minimal standard is justiªed in peacetime partly by the idea that con-
trol over the empirical state—including the army, the bureaucracy, the trea-
sury and central bank, and major infrastructure such as airports and radio
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and Odd Arne Westad, “Introduction,” in Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-
Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 8.
64. Coggins, “Friends in High Places,” pp. 451–453.
65. See Marika Landau-Wells, “Capital Cities in Civil Wars: The Locational Dimension of Sover-
eign Authority” (London: Crisis States Research Centre, 2008). This position is also already em-
bedded in some political science scholarship by virtue of dataset coding. For example, the Uppsala
Conºict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conºict Dataset
deªnes the government side of a civil conºict as the entity holding the capital. See “UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conºict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2015” (Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Peace and
Conºict Research, Uppsala University, 2015), p. 2, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/
datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conºict_dataset; and Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conºict
1946–2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 5 (September 2002), pp. 615–637,
doi:10.1177/0022343302039005007.
66. Peterson, Recognition of Governments, pp. 173–174.
67. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 111. For a discussion of the mismatch between the
empirical state and its territorial jurisdiction, see Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypoc-
risy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
stations—only requires holding the capital, though in practice this is often
not true.68
The capital city control test is also well suited to the post–World War II inter-
national environment where there is “demand” for continuous representation
for every state in the international system. Multinational organizations such as
the United Nations require daily contact between a set of individuals who are
generally agreed upon to represent their states.69 At the same time, the supply
of ambiguous representation cases has increased with the number of states and
civil conºicts. Aminimal decision rule makes the conduct of international rela-
tions easier under conditions of uncertainty. Speciªcally, the capital control test
reduces the problem of identifying legitimate sovereigns down to a single, ob-
servable dimension, much like a single-variable heuristic.70
If the capital control model accurately captures state recognition practice,
then one should see recognition of new governments occur only once the capi-
tal has changed hands, even if third parties have an economic or geopolitical
incentive to confer recognition sooner.
Methodology and Data
I weigh the explanatory power of the self-interest and capital city control mod-
els by identifying and process tracing the recognition events associated with
all center-seeking civil wars initiated from 1945 to 2014. I draw the data for
these cases from primary documents, secondary sources, and journalistic ac-
counts. This section deªnes the universe of cases, the typology of actors used
across cases, and the operationalization of the variables.
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G. Lengellé, and Caroline Andrew, eds., Capital Cities: International Perspectives (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1993).
69. M.J. Peterson, “Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished,” American Journal of In-
ternational Law, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January 1983), p. 33, doi:10.2307/2201197.
70. Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, “Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment,” in Thomas Gilovich, Dale W. Grifªn, and Daniel Kahneman, eds.,
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002), pp. 49–81; and Robin M. Hogarth and Natalia Karelaia, “Heuristic and Linear Models of
Judgment: Matching Rules and Environments,” Psychological Review, Vol. 114, No. 3 (July 2007),
pp. 733–758, doi:10.1037/0033-295X.114.3.733. It is also consistent with everyday political
metonymy (e.g., “Berlin says” as a proxy for “The government representing the people of Ger-
many says”).
identiªcation
Identiªcation of political recognition and its relationship to the military prog-
ress of a conºict requires a particular understanding of civil war. In the litera-
ture, the deªnition of civil war, as well as measurements of its onset, duration,
and termination, are somewhat contested.71 My analysis relies on two restric-
tions around the deªnition of civil war that are consistent with some, but not
all, existing perspectives.
First, I take center-seeking civil wars to be sovereignty disputes over the en-
tire state.72 As such, I measure onset, duration, and termination of a given war
at the state level. I consider only violence that is center seeking. That is, the ob-
jective of the violence is gaining or retaining control of the entire state. This
deªnition excludes from consideration any violence associated with secession-
ist objectives. In addition, this approach stands in contrast to conºict measure-
ment along government-rebel group dyads and puts my deªnition (and
number of cases) at odds with some recent analyses.73
Second, I isolate the military dimension of the conºict to deªne when a state
is experiencing a civil war. Doing so is consistent with literature focusing on
battle deaths, but not with classiªcation systems that restart civil wars upon
shifts in sovereign authority.74 The reason for the focus on military outcomes
as deªning the period of a war is the nature of my research question. The tim-
ing of recognition—a political development—is measured relative to the mili-
tary progress of the conºict.
Given these two restrictions, I begin with James Fearon’s dataset of civil war
durations, which is territorially structured (rather than dyadic) and has rela-
tively high battle-death onset and duration criteria.75 I exclude coups, popular
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Miguel, “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 48, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 3–57,
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see Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “Civil War as Sovereignty Rupture: Coding
Intra-State Conºict, 1945–2015,” University of Pennsylvania and University of Virginia, June 22,
2015.
73. For recent dyadic analyses, see David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean
Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of
Conºict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 4 (August 2009), pp. 570–597, doi:10.1177/0022002709336458; and
Barbara F. Walter, “Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War,” Journal of Conºict Resolution,
Vol. 59, No. 7 (October 2015), pp. 1242–1272, doi:10.1177/0022002714528006.
74. Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, “Civil Wars as Sovereignty Rupture,” p. 6.
75. James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May 2004), p. 278, doi:10.1177/0022343304043770. Cases enter this
dataset when the state is a participant and at least 100 deaths occur on both sides each year on av-
erage, with at least 1,000 total battle deaths over the course of the conºict.
revolutions, secessionist wars, and certain cases of indeterminate coding.76 I
augment this dataset with civil wars beginning after 1999, as well as battle-
death-based end-dates, drawn from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset
v.5-2015 and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conºict Dataset v. 4-2015, 1946–2015.77
Aggregating the relevant cases results in a universe of sixty-one center-seeking
civil wars with onset from 1945 to 2014. Some cases represent consolidation of
wars where battle deaths remain high over time, but which have been semanti-
cally separated in the literature (e.g., the First and Second Congo Wars).78 I also
include a war in Somalia after the recognized government disappears in 1991,
as this ªghting is still very much consistent with a contest for sovereign au-
thority of the state.79 The list of wars is provided in appendix A.80 Unless oth-
erwise stated, I refer to all conºicts as they are named in appendix A.
For each of these sixty-one cases, I use primary and secondary sources to
process trace the retention or transfer of sovereign authority over the course of
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search, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July 2015), pp. 536–550, doi:10.1177/0022343315595927. Where datasets dif-
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months using UCDP data.
78. I recode Afghanistan I and II into a single conºict, because violence continued through 1996
following the installation of the mujahideen government in April 1992 as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
attempted to seize Kabul. See Human Rights Watch, Blood-Stained Hands, pp. 22–100. I recode the
First and Second Congo Wars into a single conºict, because fewer than 24 months elapsed between
Laurent Kabila’s declaration of victory and the resumption of violence involving some parties
from the original conºict. See Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and
the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
79. This case disappears from datasets that require one party to the conºict to be the recognized
government.
80. Appendix A is available in the online supplementary materials.
the conºict.81 Seventy-ªve percent of center-seeking civil wars in this period
do not experience any extra-constitutional transfer of sovereign authority, and
no third-party state makes a claim that such a transfer should occur. In these
cases, the incumbent retains power or the parties eventually reach a settle-
ment. Two wars (Afghanistan and Chad) contain more than one transfer. The
recognition case list and coding is provided in appendix B.82
actors: allies, opponents, and neutrals
To create a consistent typology of actors across cases, I draw on the belliger-
ency literature.83 I deªne three categories of actors: allies, opponents, and neu-
trals, relative to a rebel group. Allies are those states that provide military or
nonmilitary aid to the rebel group. Opponents are those states that provide
military or nonmilitary aid to the incumbent government. These two types of
actors perceive there to be some beneªt from their preferred party gaining or
retaining recognition. Neutrals are the residual category containing all other
states that, by deªnition, do not participate in the conºict. I identify allies and
opponents using the primary and secondary sources for each war of interest.
In some cases, no state satisªes ally or opponent criteria.84
Allies have—at minimum—an interest in making geopolitical gains from
their preferred party toppling the incumbent. In some cases, they may have
the added beneªt of economic gains. As supporters of the incumbent, oppo-
nents risk a net loss at least in geopolitical terms, but possibly in economic
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(Conway: Department of Political Science, University of Central Arkansas, n.d.), http://uca.edu/
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Rowman and Littleªeld, 2010), pp. 207–220.
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torical Development, a New and Revised Edition (New York: Harper and Bros., 1900), p. 276.
84. In theory, it is possible that allies providing covert assistance might go undetected. The scale of
these conºicts, however (as determined by battle-death thresholds), ensures that they have been
examined by a number of scholars and journalists. In most cases, third-party participation is well
documented. Should a state’s role in the conºict go undetected, however, the status would be in-
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terms as well, by recognizing a rebel government. Premature recognition
serves only to accelerate that loss.
Neutral states may still reap beneªts of regime change (or bear costs). Given
that their interests are indeterminate as a group, I focus primarily on the
behavior of allies and opponents.
dependent variables
In the post–World War II era, states have two opportunities to accord recogni-
tion. First, they can choose to bilaterally recognize another government. Sec-
ond, they can accept or protest the credentials of a state’s representative in an
international body such as the United Nations. Legal scholars consider these to
be independent acts, so one does not necessarily affect the other in law.85
To understand recognition practice as a whole, I examine both of these out-
comes separately.
bilateral recognition. Bilateral recognition is measured through public
statements of recognition, including press releases and speeches, as well
as forms of diplomatic contact that constitute recognition.86 Statements provid-
ing less than full recognition are excluded, because they do not carry legal
weight.87 I focus on precise (dated) measures of recognition for allies and
opponents, but also report neutral state data where available. In addition,
I note those moments when a large number of countries recognize a
new government.88
multilateral recognition. Multilateral recognition is measured by cre-
dentials acceptance, protest, or blocking at the United Nations.89 As there is no
ofªcial rule in the UN Charter to determine which governments are judged to
have the right to seat representatives for a given state, it is an inherently
ºexible forum for recognition.90
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87. For detailed discussion of these distinctions in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, see Talmon,
“Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People,” pp. 219–253.
88. Often these clusters of recognitions are mentioned in secondary sources that do not
disaggregate the recognizers; the quality of data from these sources is thus relatively low.
89. This focus on the UN omits the type of multilateral recognition provided by regional organiza-
tions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the African Union. This omission oc-
curs, in part, because of space limits. Preliminary research by the author suggests that regional
bodies are highly attuned to their constitutive power with respect to member governments and
operate in a more strategic manner than does the UN when considering recognition. Given the in-
ternational signiªcance of recognition at the UN, however, that body is the focus of this analysis.
90. In 1950, following the ªrst debate over which government (the Communist or Nationalist) was
entitled to represent China, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 396 (V). The resolution
stated that controversies over representation should be considered “in the light of the Purposes
In practice, the UN Credentials Committee is responsible for evaluating
the credentials of each state’s representative and declaring them in order.
These credentials must be “issued either by the Head of the State or
Government or by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.”91 The power of the
Credentials Committee is evidenced by the practice of states that circumvent
formal rules to remain on it. The United States and Russia (and, previously, the
Soviet Union) have sat on all but one Credentials Committee since 1950,
though no rule guarantees that arrangement and it contravenes the practice of
rotating memberships.92 China has also achieved de facto permanent member-
ship on the Committee.93
The nine-member Committee produces a report at the beginning of each UN
session recommending which credentials should be accepted (or rejected) by
the General Assembly. Within the Committee, the motion to put forward the
report is based on a majoritarian vote where no member has a veto. Although
Committee members cannot unilaterally block the acceptance of credentials,
they can and do go on the record to protest cases with which they do not
agree.94 The General Assembly then votes on a resolution to accept the
Committee’s recommendations. Although the General Assembly has never
voted not to accept the report of the Credentials Committee, individual states
have motioned to do so or registered their protests.95
Credentialing at the UN thus provides a way of observing third-party
state behavior with respect to multilateral recognition. Committee members
have the power to propose rejecting a contested set of credentials. Within the
General Assembly, other states can register their protest of a representative’s
credentials during the vote to accept the Credentials Committee’s report.96
Using the annual Reports of the Credentials Committee, I record whether or
not a particular case of credentials was debated and the vote for and against
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(New York: UN, September, 2007), Rule 27.
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bly,” pp. 619–620 n. 17.
93. Matthew Grifªn, “Accrediting Democracies: Does the Credentials Committee of the United
Nations Promote Democracy through Its Accreditation Process, and Should It?” New York Univer-
sity Journal of International Law & Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Spring 2000), p. 731.
94. These protests are recorded in the reports of the Credentials Committee, traditionally agenda
item 3 in a UN Assembly session.
95. Grifªn, “Accrediting Democracies,” p. 733 n. 24.
96. Most objections regarding the acceptance of the reports of the Credentials Committee concern
recognition of the State of Israel. I ignore such objections here.
acceptance. I also record whether or not there were any objections to adopting
the Report of the Credentials Committee in the General Assembly for each rel-
evant session. As the Committee approves credentials at the start of each an-
nual United Nations session, usually between October and December, I
consider every meeting of the Committee (and subsequent General Assembly
vote) while a civil war is ongoing to be a potential observation of multilateral
recognition.97 In rare cases, Security Council members have the opportunity to
block a government from UN representation when the issue involves simulta-
neous recognition of a new state, given that a state’s application to join the UN
must pass through the Security Council. This situation arises twice in the data,
with respect to Angola and Tajikistan.98
A caveat with regard to nonªndings is required. UN documents tend to re-
cord the topics of discussion in the context of voting on member credentials, in
either the Committee or the General Assembly. Therefore, in the case of multi-
lateral recognition, if I ªnd no discussion of recognition in the documents, I
can be reasonably conªdent recognition was not controversial in that case. For
bilateral recognition, however, I cannot rule out the possibility that an observa-
tion of nonrecognition is the result of incomplete research, rather than an
absence of fact.
independent variables
In process tracing these conºicts, I considered three potential drivers of recog-
nition: total control over territory and population; control of the capital city;
and expected gains or losses for ally and opponent states.
I evaluated the degree of overall territorial control established by rebel
groups over the course of the conºict using both primary and secondary
sources.99 I code capital city control as taking all physical territory within the
internationally recognized capital, including major landmarks (e.g., the presi-
dential palace).100 Incumbents have a built-in advantage, because they can lose
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99. See the bibliography in the online supplementary materials for speciªc references.
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a portion of the capital without losing overall control. Both short- and long-
term cases of partial control are coded as being incomplete.101
Allies and opponents, by deªnition, have geopolitical interests in the
conºict. I consider the availability of economic gains (or the potential for
losses) as a separate kind of incentive for recognition (or denial thereof). I
operationalize economic gains as the presence of natural resources available
for exploitation by allies. Twenty-eight wars occurred in states with some re-
source extraction industry or known petroleum reserves.102 Using primary and
secondary sources, I code whether rebels gained control over the means to ex-
ploit those resources over the course of the conºict.103 I consider economic
gains to be available only if resources are present and under some degree of
rebel control.
Case Studies
During a conºict, recognition unfolds over time. I use civil wars in three coun-
tries to illustrate this process and the speciªc claims states make to justify their
recognition choices. I selected cases to balance the availability of a rich docu-
mentary record with sound comparisons. The simultaneous declaration of two
governments of Angola upon independence in 1975 provides unique insights
into bilateral recognition conditions. A comparison of Angola with the contem-
poraneous ªrst Cambodian civil war (1967–75) allows for some control over
key policymakers and the geopolitical environment, and offers a clearer pic-
ture of the multilateral recognition process, which occurred over three sessions
at the UN. Finally, the ªrst two Chadian civil wars demonstrate that variation
in outcomes is not solely the result of variation in the country of interest.
angola, 1975–2003
Although recognition of the ªrst government of independent Angola is inex-
tricably tied to its recognition as a newly independent state, the issue of gov-
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101. This includes Charles Taylor’s incursions into Monrovia from 1990 to 1992 and the partition
of Beirut, Lebanon, between 1988 and 1990 (Lebanon II).
102. For oil and natural gas reserves, I use the coding in Humphreys, “Natural Resources,
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Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, “The Geography of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39,
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103. In several cases—Congo-Brazzaville, for example—it is clear that companies pursue their
own agendas, independent of their national government and sometimes to that government’s det-
riment. I do not code those cases as having beneªts for the recognizing state. See Global Witness,
ernment recognition, particularly at the bilateral level, can be considered
separately, because there appears to have been no question in the international
community that Angola should become an independent state.104 The Angolan
case provides a test not only of the relative weight of self-interest and control
of the capital city, but also of the commitment to evaluating a government
based on its effective control over the totality of the state’s territory.
timeline. In January 1975, the Portuguese government committed to grant-
ing Angola its independence on November 11, 1975.105 The three major milita-
rized independence movements nominally became participants in a transition
government prior to independence, but in practice fought one another for an
absolute upper hand. The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
(MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto, and the Frente Nacional de Libertação
de Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto, both had forces in the inter-
nationally accepted capital, Luanda. Jonas Savimbi’s União Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) was based in the countryside.106
The MPLA was avowedly communist and received overt support from
Cuba, including weapons and troops, and covert aid from the Soviet Union.107
The United States initially supported the FNLA with covert monetary aid, but
also began supporting UNITA in July 1975.108 China supported the FNLA, and
a number of regional powers in Africa provided military and logistical sup-
port to all three movements.109
On June 27, 1975, the issue of which group would be victorious was raised at
a meeting of the National Security Council.110 Director of Central Intelligence
William Colby presented a paper arguing that “military control of Luanda by
either group would not necessarily determine control of or inºuence over the
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108. Memorandum of Conversation, June 20, 1975, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)
1969–1976: Vol. 28: Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ofªce [GPO], 2011),
pp. 258–261; and Memorandum of Conversation, July 18, 1975, 9:01–10:12 a.m., FRUS 1969–1976,
Vol. 28, p. 286.
109. Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 227–235.
110. Minutes of a National Security Meeting, June 27, 1975, 2:30–3:20 p.m., FRUS 1969–1976,
Vol. 28, pp. 266–270.
rest of Angola, particularly in the rich agricultural areas or along all the main
transportation routes.”111 When President Gerald Ford asked Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger his view, however, Kissinger replied:
I do question the judgment that control of the capital is not of importance. The
history of Africa has shown that a nation’s only focal point is the capital, and
whoever has the capital has a claim on international support. In the Congo
civil war, the reason we came out on top is because we never lost Leopoldville.
If Neto can get Luanda, and drive the others out, he will have a power base,
and gradually gain support of other Africans.112
Neto and the MPLA dislodged the FNLA from Luanda in mid-July 1975.113
But by early November, the MPLA controlled only Luanda and a belt of terri-
tory from the coast to Zaire, while the FNLA held positions to the north, and
allied FNLA and UNITA forces held the southern half of the country.114
Despite his statement to the president in June, days before the Portuguese
withdrawal in November, Kissinger cabled U.S. embassies worldwide asking
them to press an “effective control” argument with their counterparts:
WE WOULD VIEW A CLAIM BY THE MPLA THAT IT IS THE GOVERN-
MENT OF ANGOLA, AND THAT IT MERITS RECOGNITION AS SUCH, AS
UNFOUNDED, BECAUSE IN FACT IT CONTROLS A MINORITY OF THE
POPULATION AND TERRITORY OF ANGOLA AND CONSEQUENTLY IS
NOT IN A POSITION TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE OF
ANGOLA INTERNATIONALLY. RECOGNITION BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY OF THE MPLA REGIME AS THE ANGOLAN GOVERN-
MENT COULD ONLY SERVE AS FURTHER OBSTACLE TO SEARCH FOR A
PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND TO VALIDATION OF PRINCI-
PLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE CLAIM OF FNLA/UNITA WOULD,
IN OUR VIEW, DESERVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMUNITY IN WEIGHING POSSIBILITIES AND TIMING
OF RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ANGOLA AND OF THE GOV-
ERNMENT WHICH ACTUALLY EXERCISES EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF
THAT STATE.115
The replies sent from U.S. embassies provide some indication of the relative
persuasiveness of the “effective control” argument, in contrast to Kissinger’s
own position in June that the capital would be decisive.
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From the embassy in Khartoum:
IN RESPONSE MY QUESTION, FONMIN [foreign minister of Sudan]
STATED THAT GOS [the government of Sudan], LIKE USG [the U.S. govern-
ment], PLANS REFRAIN FROM MAKING ANY HASTY MOVE TOWARD
RECOGNIZING MPLA . . . HE FEELS NUMBER AFRICAN STATES
MAY RECOGNIZE MPLA SIMPLY BECAUSE IT HOLDS THE CAPITAL, IN
HOPE THAT GROUP’S CURRENT RADICALISM WILL BE TEMPERED BY
RESPONSIBILITY.116
The embassy in Paris equated holding or gaining the capital with victory in
the civil war:
THE QUAI [the French ministry of foreign affairs] ESTIMATES THAT THE
MPLA NOW CONTROLS LESS THAN A THIRD OF THE TERRITORY AND
POPULATION OF ANGOLA. GIVEN LUANDA’S PSYCHOLOGICAL IM-
PORTANCE NETO WILL PUT ALL HIS EFFORT INTO HOLDING IT AND
THE FNLA/UNITA ARE NOT LIKELY SOON TO ACHIEVE VICTORY.117
From the embassy in Tanzania:
INFORMATION: THOUGH TANGOV [the government of Tanzania] AND
MEDIA CREDIT MPLA CLAIMS TO CONTROL MOST OF ANGOLA,
TANGOV ALREADY FULLY AWARE OF EVIDENCE TO CONTRARY . . .
COMMENT: TANGOV WILL BE AMONG THE FIRST TO RECOGNIZE
MPLA AS GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA.118
U.S. allies provided some acknowledgment of “effective control,” in theory.
From the embassy in Canada:
GOC [the government of Canada] IS NOT RECOGNIZING ANY GOVERN-
MENT PENDING THE ABILITY OF A GOVERNMENT TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT IT HAS EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE TERRITORY AND THAT
IT IS ABLE TO HONOR ANGOLA’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.”119
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Both the MPLA and a UNITA/FNLA coalition announced new governments
of Angola on November 11, 1975. The MPLA announced its capital as Luanda,
while the coalition announced its capital as Huambo.120 Within two days, a
dozen states had extended bilateral recognition to the MPLA as the ofªcial
government of Angola, and more allied and neutral states granted recognition
through the end of the year.121 No state, including the United States or other al-
lies providing military aid, extended bilateral recognition to the UNITA/
FNLA coalition.
Passage of the Tunney amendment in December 1975 restricted Kissinger’s
ability to fund UNITA, but he continued the diplomatic pressure not to extend
recognition to the MPLA.122 Kissinger also put pressure on the American ªrm
Gulf Oil to stop payments due to the government of Angola from their opera-
tions in the oil enclave of Cabinda, hoping to weaken the MPLA.123 France
promised to continue military aid to UNITA, including Mirage helicopters and
French pilots.124 Neither France nor the United States extended formal recogni-
tion, however.
In early February 1976, UNITA lost control of its provisional capital
Huambo.125 The Organization of African Unity voted on February 10, twenty-
seven to nineteen in favor of admitting Angola as represented by the MPLA
government.126 Recognition by the United States’ major allies, including
Britain, Canada, and France, soon followed, though UNITAmaintained a com-
mitment to resistance and the MPLA still did not control all Angolan terri-
tory.127 In justifying its new position to the United States, France cited the
desire to support its regional allies that were also planning to recognize
the MPLA.128
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The United States withheld bilateral recognition of the Angolan government
and, in June 1976, vetoed Angola’s entry into the United Nations, thereby de-
nying the MPLA government multilateral recognition, with an understanding
this would irritate U.S. allies.129 Six months later, however, the United States
abstained from a second vote regarding Angolan membership, and the MPLA-
led government gained representation at the United Nations.130
The United States never subsequently challenged the credentials of the
MPLA’s representative. Yet, it did not extend bilateral recognition to the Ango-
lan government until 1993.131 The civil war itself did not end until 2002, after
the death of Jonas Savimbi and negotiation of a settlement.132
analysis. Bilateral recognition of the MPLA by its allies is consistent with
both the self-interest and capital city control models of recognition. The Soviet
Union and Cuba gained an allied government by recognizing the MPLA, and
their preferred group also held the ofªcial capital. Their interest was largely
geopolitical; an American ªrm beneªted most from Angola’s oil resources at
the time, and no move was made to displace Gulf Oil. Still, neither majority
control over the territory and population nor battleªeld momentum proved
sufªcient grounds for UNITA’s allies to extend recognition, suggesting pure
geopolitical interest was not enough to justify that action. As an MPLA oppo-
nent, however, the United States appears to have prioritized geopolitical gains
by delaying recognition of the MPLA at the UN (and denying it bilaterally for
eighteen years). Other states, including Canada, France, and UNITA’s regional
allies, appeared satisªed with the MPLA’s less-than-total accomplishments on
the battleªeld, though it was known that Soviet and Cuban assistance had
made these achievements possible.133
The Angolan case thus suggests that holding the capital may be necessary
for positive recognition by allies, though it may not always be sufªcient with
respect to opponents.
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cambodia i, 1967–75
In June 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger argued that the signiªcance of the
capital city for bilateral recognition was a feature only of African politics.134
The ªrst Cambodian civil war between Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic govern-
ment and the Khmer Rouge suggests otherwise. Given that the cases included
recognition events less than one year apart, many of the individuals involved
(including Kissinger) and the prevailing geopolitical conditions were the same.
The case also provides a clearer look at the arguments around multilateral rec-
ognition and its timing.135 As with Angola, economic beneªts of recognition
for allies were not a signiªcant feature of the conºict, but geopolitical concerns
were. The progression of rebel control from the periphery to the capital also il-
lustrates how the city can be treated as a necessary condition of recognition,
both bilateral and multilateral.
timeline. The war began as a rebellion against Prince Sihanouk’s govern-
ment, primarily in Cambodia’s periphery in 1967. In March, 1970, Prime
Minister Lon Nol and the National Assembly orchestrated a coup while
Sihanouk was in Moscow. Lon Nol’s post-coup government received
Cambodia’s UN seat without comment.136
Sihanouk’s government-in-exile (the Gouvernement Royal Uni National
du Kampuchéa, or GRUNK) had no armed forces, so the prince accepted a
plan proposed by China and North Vietnam to ally with the Khmer Rouge, a
quasi-communist rebel group, to gain a military foothold inside the country.137
The United States was the Khmer Rouge’s primary opponent, providing mili-
tary assistance to the Lon Nol government as part of a broader anti-communist
strategy in Southeast Asia.138
Over the next several years, the Khmer Rouge consolidated its hold on the
Cambodian countryside, instituting rigid social reforms, including collectiv-
ization.139 Relations between Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge were strained,
and Sihanouk’s control over Khmer Rouge forces was often questioned.140
International Security 43:1 126
134. Minutes of a National Security Meeting, June 27, 1975, 2:30–3:20 p.m., p. 266.
135. The ªrst Cambodian civil war included two transfers of sovereign authority, one by coup
(1970) and one by conquest (1975). I only discuss the details of the coup inasmuch as it determined
the parties to the conºict. A number of governments continued to recognize Sihanouk’s ousted
government-in-exile, but I do not consider those recognitions to include recognition of the Khmer
Rouge after its alliance with Sihanouk.
136. Ratliff, “UN Representation Disputes,” p. 1244.
137. Wilfred P. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–1975 (College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 1997), pp. 53, 60.
138. Memorandum from Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the Presi-
dent’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), August 6, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976: Vol. 10:
Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2010), pp. 394–395.
139. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, pp. 147, 203.
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In 1973, Sihanouk demanded Cambodia’s UN seat by both presenting cre-
dentials to the Credentials Committee and having allies request that the
General Assembly vote on the matter. Sihanouk argued before the General
Assembly that Khmer Rouge forces controlled 80 percent of Cambodia’s terri-
tory and 90 percent of the population, but acknowledged that Lon Nol’s forces
held Phnom Penh and several other cities. The General Assembly elected
not to render a decision on the issue, leaving Lon Nol’s representatives in
Cambodia’s seat.141
In 1974, a second debate occurred in the General Assembly, resulting in a de-
cision to revisit the issue in the next session.142 Although the Credentials
Committee ultimately voted in December 1974 to accept the Lon Nol govern-
ment’s credentials, China (a Khmer Rouge ally at that point) voted in favor of
rejection and three members abstained.143
Khmer Rouge forces continued to extend their control over Cambodian ter-
ritory, and on January 1, 1975, began to bombard both Phnom Penh and the
Pochentong airport.144 Throughout February and March, Khmer Rouge forces
closed in on the capital. On March 30, the Soviet Union extended recognition
to the Khmer Rouge/GRUNK coalition; and on April 1, President Lon Nol re-
signed and ºed into exile, at which point India extended recognition.145 Khmer
Rouge troops entered the outskirts of Phnom Penh in the ªrst week of April,
and the United States evacuated its embassy on April 12.146 France extended
recognition on April 12, and on April 17, Khmer Rouge forces claimed full con-
trol over Phnom Penh.147 On April 18, China recognized the Khmer Rouge
government; Canada on April 25; and Britain on May 2.148
The United States did not extend bilateral recognition to the Khmer Rouge
regime, but also did not block its taking up Cambodia’s UN seat.149 The Khmer
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Rouge representative received Cambodia’s UN seat without comment at the
beginning of the thirtieth session in October 1975.150
analysis. The Angolan case suggested that capital city control is necessary
for large-scale bilateral recognition, even by allies. The Cambodian case af-
ªrms the conclusion that the capital is necessary, even when prior control has
been established over the territory and general population. This requirement
appears to hold for bilateral and multilateral recognition. The Cambodian case
also demonstrates that the signiªcance of capitals is not an African phenome-
non. From the opponent perspective, the United States was again unique in
withholding bilateral recognition from a government others had already
recognized, suggesting a relatively strong commitment to the logic of self-
interest, at least at the bilateral level. Other states, however, behaved as though
the change in control over Phnom Penh was indeed decisive.
chad i, 1965–72 and chad ii, 1976–95
Where the Cambodian case illustrates the transfer of the capital at war’s end,
Chad provides several instances of recognition when combat was clearly on-
going. I note in the timeline section the three points at which recognition trans-
fers occurred. Taken together, the ªrst and second Chadian civil wars suggest
that control of a capital alone can be sufªcient for both levels of recognition,
even by opponents, and that combatants can orient their campaigns to take
this fact into account.
The Chad cases also provide some insight into the role of economic beneªts
for recognition. As a backdrop to the conºict, U.S. and French oil ªrms vied for
the rights to explore Chad’s potential oil reserves, and their national govern-
ments took this contest into account in their support of various factions.151
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timeline, chad i. The ªrst Chadian civil war began in 1965 with a rebellion
against the government of Francis Tombalbaye, who had ruled Chad since
its independence in 1960.152 In June 1966, a group calling itself the Front
de Libération National (FROLINAT) began a guerrilla campaign in the coun-
tryside.153 The group received support initially from Sudan, but by 1969
Muammar Qaddaª had taken control of Libya and extended support to
FROLINAT as well.154 FROLINAT made inroads against the Chadian govern-
ment forces until Tombalbaye requested intervention from French troops in
1968, who slowed and reversed FROLINAT’s advance.155
As part of a diplomatic spat with the Tombalbaye government, Qaddaª
formally recognized FROLINAT as Libya’s government and invited the group
to train on Libyan territory in 1971.156 At the time Qaddaª extended recogni-
tion, FROLINAT’s forces were conªned to a single region (Tibesti) along the
Libyan border.157 No other country or organization extended recognition to
FROLINAT. By 1972, Tombalbaye had improved relations with Libya, and
Qaddaª withdrew his recognition of FROLINAT.158
timeline, chad ii. In April 1975, Tombalbaye was assassinated by a group
of junior military ofªcers in a coup, and Félix Malloum became head of
state.159 By 1976, the remnants of FROLINAT had launched campaigns against
the new government. All of the FROLINAT factions, other than the one led by
Hissène Habré, received support from Libya.160
Malloum and Habré signed a peace agreement in August 1978, but the
agreement was short-lived. In February 1979, ªghting between Habré’s forces
and Malloum’s forces began in the capital, N’Djamena.161 Another former
FROLINAT leader, Goukouni Oueddei, used the opportunity to push his
forces into N’Djamena as well. By February 25, 1979, the conºict had caused
more than 1,000 casualties, and 80,000 civilians had ºed the city.162
When peace talks began, both Goukouni’s and Habré’s forces were present
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in the capital, but some observers suggest that Goukouni’s forces had the ad-
vantage.163 Goukouni certainly beneªted most from the setup of the coalition
government that emerged when Malloum resigned. Although eleven factions
were represented in the successor Gouvernement d’Union Nationale et de
Transition (GUNT), Goukouni was named president and Habré became minis-
ter of defense.164
The GUNT was established as the government of Chad on November 11,
1979.165 Its level of control outside the capital was minimal, however.166 On
November 14, the United Nations Credentials Committee accepted the creden-
tials of Chad’s representative without comment (Transfer 1).167
Goukouni and Habré quickly resumed their battle for control of
N’Djamena.168 Habré’s forces established control over one administrative zone
in the city by the end of March 1980.169 Libyan forces intervened at Goukouni’s
request and succeeded in pushing Habré’s forces out of their positions by
December 1980.170 Habré ºed to the east of the country.171 Estimates are that
these two battles for N’Djamena led to 100,000 (of 200,000 total inhabitants at
the time) displaced into Cameroon and destruction of most of the city’s physi-
cal infrastructure.172
Habré regrouped with approximately $10 million in covert funds from the
United States. France supported the GUNT openly with weapons shipments
and endorsed the deployment of Organization of African Unity (OAU) forces
to back-stop Goukouni’s government.173 When OAU peacekeepers replaced
the Libyans, however, Habré went on the offensive.174 His forces mounted a
rapid assault on N’Djamena and took the city on June 7, 1982; GUNT forces
withdrew north.175 Nigeria and Guinea extended recognition to Habré within
days.176 The United States recognized Habré’s regime later in the month.177
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Habré’s representative was seated at the UN without incident in October at the
thirty-seventh session (Transfer 2).178 Libya (an opponent) delayed recognition
until 1988.179
Habré’s forces never had effective control over Chad, forcing the new leader
to rely on continued support from both the United States and France, includ-
ing the redeployment of French troops in 1983 to defend against Libyan-
supported factions.180 On December 2, 1990, one such faction, led by Idriss
Déby, succeeded in taking N’Djamena a day after Habré ºed the city. The cam-
paign was quick, as Déby’s forces traveled 600 miles across the Sahel in
two days.181 Déby ofªcially proclaimed a new government on December 4.182
The French government began dealing with Déby as head of state within
days, extending 90 million francs in credit and an invitation to Paris.183
The United States, which supported Habré’s rule and initially considered
Déby “a pro-Libyan puppet,” delayed recognition for four months.184
The Déby government’s representative was accepted at the UN in November
1991 for the forty-sixth session without incident or discussion (Transfer 3).185
Déby has been the recognized head of government in Chad since 1990, though
the second civil war continued until 1995.
analysis. The Chadian case illustrates the interplay of economic interests,
recognition, and the military conºict. There was little question that any of the
combatants controlled signiªcant territory outside the capital. Sprints to
N’Djamena were the preferred tactic for acquiring political authority.186 Multi-
lateral recognition, once the capital was held, was uncontroversial at the
UN, and the facts of (the lack of) control were unambiguous. Control of
the capital appeared to be necessary, but also sufªcient, not once, but on sev-
eral occasions.
The Chadian case also illustrates the relative importance of economic inter-
ests. As competitors for the right to exploit Chad’s potential oil wealth located
primarily in the south of the country, the United States and France often
supported rival groups. Each was quick to provide recognition to their pre-
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ferred party upon capture of the capital, but not before. The only country devi-
ating from this pattern was Libya, which recognized FROLINAT without its
holding the capital and delayed recognition of the Habré government even
when he did. Libya’s lead was never followed, however. Instead, allies and the
international community used capital city control as a necessary and sufªcient
condition; the United States, when it played the role of opponent, delayed bi-
lateral recognition but not indeªnitely.
The Chadian case also highlights the consequences of ªxating on the capital:
casualties and damage were concentrated in that space on multiple occasions,
speciªcally to achieve control of the city with the ultimate end of gaining or
maintaining international recognition.
Remaining Cases
Across the case studies, both self-interest and the capital control test explain
some third-party recognition behavior. The United States, in particular, ap-
pears to grant or withhold bilateral recognition on the basis of self-interest.
Other states, however, appear more willing to treat control of the capital as a
necessary and sufªcient condition for recognition. This section investigates
how well the self-interest and capital city control models travel to the rest of
the data (ªfty-six wars with twelve recognition events).187
First, I consider how often allies prematurely recognize new rebel govern-
ments. Three of the four civil wars discussed in the case studies included pre-
mature recognition (Cambodia I was the exception). In the remaining data,
premature recognition is also the norm; eleven out of the twelve recognition
events qualify as premature. Of these premature recognitions, rebel groups
held the capital in nine out of eleven cases.188 The median number of days be-
tween capital seizure and ally recognition was two.189
What about the “most likely” cases for a self-interested model of recogni-
tion, when economic gains are available? Do allies recognize prior to capital
seizure (as with Libya), or do they wait (as with Chad II)? Of the ªfty-six civil
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wars in the remaining data, twenty-four occurred in states with natural re-
sources or petroleum reserves. Of these twenty-four, rebels gained control over
those resources and had active allies in fourteen cases. Allies extended prema-
ture recognition to those rebels in only two cases and both times after the capi-
tal had changed hands. In other words, economic gain does not appear to be
sufªcient for recognition in the remainder of the data. The general pattern con-
forms to Chad II, not Libya.
How often did multilateral recognition follow who held the capital? In
three of eleven cases, it did not. These three bilaterally recognized gov-
ernments were either blocked from taking seats at the UN (Taliban/
Afghanistan; People’s Republic of Kampuchea/Cambodia II) or substantially
delayed (People’s Republic of China/China).190 While the Taliban and People’s
Republic of Kampuchea cases had broad international consensus for non-
recognition, the primary architect of the People’s Republic of China/China de-
lay was the United States.191 These exceptions are notable, but not the rule. In
eight of the eleven cases, rebel groups that received bilateral recognition from
allies and held their capital also received UN seats.
Given that the United States appears willing to delay multilateral recogni-
tion and to deny bilateral recognition, how often do other states do the
same? Rarely. In the remaining cases, only in Tajikistan did an opponent
(Afghanistan) deny bilateral recognition.192
On balance, then, whereas the self-interest model appears to ªt the United
States well, particularly with respect to its behavior as an opponent, the capital
control test appears more consistent with behavior of states in general, both as
allies and opponents.
If combatants expect that winning the capital will also win them the political
prize of recognition, how often do cases resemble Chad II, where the capital is
prioritized over establishing broader territorial control? The data from the re-
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maining conºicts suggest that although rebel groups do not always have the
option of prioritizing the capital, given territorial and personnel constraints,
those that can and do subsequently improve their odds of ultimate victory. In
sixteen of the ªfty-six remaining conºicts, rebels were able to contest the capi-
tal at some stage and achieved widespread recognition seven times. Those
rebel victories, however, came overwhelmingly from efforts that prioritized
the capital (ªve out of seven wins), rather than through the gradual accumula-
tion of territory.193 Rebels rarely win if they never contest the capital (four rebel
victories in forty civil wars).
Finally, if prioritizing control of the capital appears to improve the odds of
achieving political victory, what are the consequences? Of the sixteen conºicts
in the remaining data in which the capital was contested, eleven resulted in
signiªcant destruction and/or displacement of civilians.194 Anecdotally,
in Monrovia, Liberia, “all major infrastructures were damaged or looted,” as
battles for the city occurred several times over the course of both Liberian civil
wars and government employees ºed.195 The Battle of Kabul (1992–96) was
similarly catastrophic for residents and infrastructure.196 Accounts of the battle
for Brazzaville in 1997 suggest that ªghting over control of a capital city can be
utterly destructive, even in a short time, with the right weaponry.197
Combatants also appear aware that the odds of winning politically rest on
who holds the capital city. The ªxation of rebel leader Charles Taylor on cap-
turing Monrovia, for example, was not unique. The combatants in the early
stages of Somalia’s civil war exhibited the same awareness and tactical
focus on controlling Mogadishu, which was equated early on with interna-
tional recognition.198
Nor does seizing the capital foreshadow the end of ªghting. In the twelve
conºicts remaining in the data where capitals are seized and rebels receive bi-
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lateral recognition from at least one ally, their civil wars continue for approxi-
mately ªve years.199
It is important to note that combatants may quite reasonably equate their
capitals with unique symbolic value in signaling leadership credibility to
their domestic audiences.200 But capitals are not treated, even by domestic ac-
tors, as sufªcient for claiming total victory—if that were the case, surrender of
an incumbent would routinely follow capital seizure. Only the international
community treats control of the capital as sufªcient for political victory.
Conclusion
Civil wars weaken many state structures. The criteria states use to accord rec-
ognition during these wars has the potential to contribute to state weakness in
several distinct ways. The ªrst is by setting the bar low. Using a minimal stan-
dard of territorial control for recognition, the international community often
creates governments whose authority is immediately in question. This low bar
may also act as an incentive to initiate conºict rather than to pursue alternative
forms of power transition such as electoral victory, though I did not test
this hypothesis directly. State weakness is also exacerbated by the particular
standard currently in use: privileging control of the capital puts a target on
a developed region of the state and often on the highest concentration of its cit-
izens. These assets can be destroyed and these people displaced as part of
combatants’ rational responses to strong incentives generated by the interna-
tional community.
The criteria used by the international community to accord recognition dur-
ing civil war have not been static, however. International legal scholarship has
documented the changes to recognition criteria, both stated and enforced, over
time.201 Territorial control has not always been a sufªcient condition for recog-
nition. States have also considered measures of a new government’s legiti-
macy, including the willingness to conform to international ªnancial and
treaty obligations, the endorsement of the new executive by the legislature,
and in some cases the results of popular referendums.202
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In the past, states have also attempted to shift collective recognition stan-
dards to reduce the incentive for undesirable behavior. Both Central American
leaders in the early twentieth century and African leaders in the early twenty-
ªrst have attempted to reject coups as a political transition mechanism by re-
fusing to recognize in regional forums those who come to power that way.203
This is clearly a pragmatic practice for the leaders involved, but it also
illustrates the kind of explicit coordination that can occur around recog-
nition standards.
It seems unreasonable to expect civil war to vanish as a means of power
transition. The primary concern for recognizers, therefore, should be altering
the incentives that now encourage maximally destructive and costly tactics to
achieve political victory.
Although no systematic change will affect the behavior of states that wish to
accord recognition based on a self-interested calculus, the standards of multi-
lateral recognition could be reconsidered. I suggest two changes to multilateral
recognition that jointly could alter combatant incentives.
First, territorial control thresholds of any kind should be abandoned as
a sufªcient criterion for recognition. The Cambodia and Chad case studies
illustrate why territorial control is not a Goldilocks problem. Any “just
right” amount of territory—any level of the bar—creates the same incentive
to inºict whatever damage is required to meet that threshold, if it is sufªcient
for recognition.
Second, the UN should begin to accept empty seats as a genuine alternative
when representation disputes arise. Although this measure has been proposed
within the Credentials Committee in several cases, it is almost never
agreed to.204 A credible threat of nonrecognition—including of the incumbent
government—and the corresponding loss of rights within institutions such as
the World Bank would increase the collective leverage of member states over
all combatants. Political victory, in the form of multilateral recognition, would
cease to be zero sum. All combatants could lose.
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These two changes to multilateral recognition open up the possibility of ac-
cording recognition based on other criteria. Although the capital control test is
relatively easy for third-party states to monitor, it is costly for civilians and,
more abstractly, for the international system. Any new standard must weigh
the cost of monitoring against potential gains. One possible criterion with rela-
tively low incremental monitoring costs is a disqualiªcation standard based
on battleªeld conduct. Data on combatant conduct are already collected
by nongovernmental organizations and international bodies. Similar to
coups disqualifying their perpetrators, certain actions in the course of war—
indiscriminate targeting of civilians, ethnic cleansing, and the use of certain
types of weaponry, for example—could disqualify combatants (the leadership
group, in particular) as candidates for recognition. This would not guarantee
good behavior by combatants, but it would increase the costs of bad behavior,
possibly to prohibitive levels.
By setting the standards for what it means to be recognized as a govern-
ment, third-party actors wield considerable inºuence over civil conºict with-
out ever providing a single bullet or dollar. Altering these standards has the
potential to affect the behavior of combatants during civil war. Ultimately, in-
ternational recognition will be what states make of it.
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